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Abstract
Developing countries face considerable challenges in the design and operation of local
infrastructure planning systems in decentralized or decentralizing countries. Many of these
are well documented, but the complex political economy environment in which planning
evolves has received insufficient attention. The forces driving decentralization and other
public sector reforms shape how planning emerges, functions and performs. Local planning
involves a range of differentially empowered and variously motivated actors at multiple
levels and in diverse ways. The dynamics among them can support or undermine authentic
local planning, with potentially significant implications for results. This paper reviews the
evolution of local infrastructure planning with a focus on least developed countries,
outlining the key expected and observed relationships among decentralization, planning
systems and infrastructure development. The main goal is to create greater awareness of
political economy issues that could inform the design and management of more effective
and pragmatic local infrastructure planning systems.
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I.

Introduction

Developing countries often have complex, multi-level infrastructure planning systems
that not uncommonly underperform relative to needs and expectations.1 These systems
have undergone numerous transformations as development thinking and practice have
evolved. Many countries, however, continue to face great challenges in making local
infrastructure planning and delivery more effective. Political economy forces are a
critical factor in how local infrastructure planning systems have developed and perform.
Planning, both in general with respect to infrastructure, covers a vast landscape. It can
involve multiple levels of government and administration, from central to grassroots, and
relationships among levels can be complex and poorly defined in law and/or in practice.
Sub-tiers within levels may play a role in infrastructure. At each level, there is an array of
interested and/or influential actors—elected bodies, government bureaucrats, and diverse
nongovernmental entities ranging from business to civil society groups. In aid dependent
countries, international agencies can play a major role, and particularly in large urban
areas, private sector firms may be engaged as infrastructure service delivery partners.
Each actor faces incentives that may support or undermine infrastructure delivery.
Infrastructure itself is diverse because of variations in its inherent characteristics, such as
the extent to which it is “public” in nature, the scale at which it must be provided, and the
types of skills required to deliver it, among others. Land and natural resources, often
subject to complex legal frameworks and contested control and use, are involved in
creating and operating infrastructure, adding further complexity. The various levels,
actors and characteristics of infrastructure shape the political economy environment in
which it must be delivered.
Some challenges of infrastructure planning have been at least partly created or
exacerbated by the pursuit of the very reforms intended to improve public sector
performance in developing countries. Decentralization, which has been an influential
trend for more than two decades, typically augments existing local infrastructure
responsibilities and introduces important new actors, processes, funding sources and
accountability channels into development planning. Existing actors, however, do not
simply disappear, and political economy dynamics set in motion by decentralization can
affect how local planning and the overall intergovernmental reforms in general perform.
Beyond decentralization, reforms in service delivery and financing mechanisms pursued
through sectoral line ministries, finance ministries and community driven development
initiatives can further affect the development planning landscape. Such reforms may be
undertaken in response to perceived threats from or independently of decentralization.
1

There is diverse literature on infrastructure in developing countries, including the effects of infrastructure
on development (e.g. Straub 2012), infrastructure policy (e.g. Estache 2004), outcomes (e.g. BricenoGarmendia et. al. 2004), finance (e.g. Kehew, Matsukawa and Petersen 2005, Estache 2010, Helm 2010),
and private participation. (e.g. Harris 2003), The literature on infrastructure planning is primarily technical
and sector specific. Work on the political economy of local infrastructure planning in developing countries
is limited, but the general political economy of decentralization literature discussed below is relevant.
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Whichever the case, gaps and redundancies in service responsibilities and conflicts over
power and resources can easily arise as the multiple—typically uncoordinated—reform
processes unfold. These in turn can have consequential effects on the delivery of
infrastructure and citizen confidence in and satisfaction with government.
Other evolving dynamics can significantly affect local infrastructure planning. The
demand for more and better infrastructure increases with greater economic development,
higher citizen awareness/expectations and the influence of external trends and global
agreements (e.g. the Millennium Development Goals). The 2008 global financial crisis
affected resource availability for infrastructure and placed subnational governments in
many countries under pressure to replace funds they could no longer get from national
budgets.2 Spatial factors may also evolve in consequential ways. Commercial and
residential developments in legally separate jurisdictions, for example, may grow
physically closer over time, making administratively independent jurisdictions more
interdependent and potentially complicating infrastructure planning.
Finally, local political dynamics can be very important. These are related to interactions
among different types of subnational institutions (e.g. cooperation or lack thereof among
neighboring jurisdictions in providing network infrastructure) and relationships between
local governments and their constituents (e.g. the degree of political competition, the
extent of elite capture and patronage, and the nature of citizen interactions with locally
elected officials). These dynamics can affect the success of decentralized planning
systems in using securable resources for the right infrastructure in the right places.
Given the vast scope of local infrastructure planning systems, approaches and influences,
this paper is selective in coverage. A broad overview of the political economy landscape
of infrastructure planning is provided in the first few sections, but the core of the paper
focuses on the development of planning systems under decentralization, particularly in
least developed countries. The next section briefly summarizes the evolution of thinking
about development planning with a focus on the role of decentralization reforms that
have emerged under varying political economy conditions. Section III provides a brief
overview of infrastructure planning related roles played by key actors, and Section IV
reviews how a range of public sector reforms beyond decentralization—with their own
political economy dynamics—affect local infrastructure planning. Section V summarizes
a country case that illustrates common challenges to local infrastructure planning and
their political economy underpinnings. Sections VI and VII provide a more detailed
treatment of local infrastructure planning with a focus on least developed countries,
respectively outlining relationships between decentralization and planning systems and
considering the role of planning systems in infrastructure development. Finally, the last
section provides some concluding comments.

2

See United Cities and Local Governments (2010).
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II.

The Basic Structure and Changing Context of Planning Systems

Public sector development planning systems for infrastructure and beyond have
historically been structured in diverse ways.3 In the post-World War II era of
industrialized country support for developing countries, planning systems were based on
a development model predicated on a large government role in the economy, and
infrastructure planning was built around macroeconomic development needs. Such
planning was centralized and technocratic, although interactions among government
levels allowed modest local input. Traditional urban spatial and land use planning was
often conducted separately, sometimes through dedicated subnational systems and
sometimes through central agencies. This general approach persisted in the era of rolling
back the state that began in the 1980s, although there was more emphasis on publicprivate partnerships to deliver roads, water and other major infrastructure.
Planning systems
Local planning—in the sense that it focused on local infrastructure and involved local
actors—was, of course, occurring even in the era of heavy centralization. National
governments set up ministries, subnational administrations, and various bodies at one or
more levels to play some role in planning. Local infrastructure could be provided for in
national, sectoral or subnational plans, and various mechanisms bridged certain aspects of
one or more types of plan and involved different combinations of actors (Figure 1).
A range of planning relationships existed, but in relatively centralized systems there was
usually some type of hierarchical orientation, such that any one actor needed approval
from a higher level. A wide variety of mechanisms, some in the national budget and some
off budget, were used to finance infrastructure. The planning process could be top-down
(lower levels awaited plans or instructions for preparing local plans from the center),
bottom up (central plans and budgets for local services were not prepared until requests
from lower levels had been passed up and reviewed), or something in between. The
locus on accountability and control of resources, however, was dominantly upward.
In some countries with local government traditions, semi-autonomous local planning
could exist in parallel with the main planning system. Local governments might
produce—sometimes independently from the national multi-level planning system—
urban or rural development plans, which commonly focused on infrastructure. These
typically had dedicated but insufficient funding sources—transfers or project funding
mechanisms—attached to them. Separate legal status and more independence in
infrastructure planning and finance were more likely in metropolitan and larger urban
areas, although still typically be subject to a national legal, administrative and financial

3

See, for example, Agarwala (1983), Conyers and Hills (1984), Healey (1997), Sundaram (1997), Rodwin
and Sanyal (2000), Sanyal (2005), Hall and Tewdwr-Jones (2010) and Healey (2012) for overviews from
various perspectives on development planning and urban and regional planning.
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framework.4 These bodies may or may not have elected councils, and there may or may
not have been interjurisdictional planning or coordination in metropolitan areas.

The emergence of decentralization
As institutional and governance concerns became prominent and global political and
economic conditions evolved, a wave of public sector restructuring, democratization and
civic engagement reforms took center stage. This included a growing decentralization
trend.5 As decentralization became more common in developing countries, an appropriate
role of subnational governments in infrastructure had to be considered. The approach has
varied considerably across countries due to differences in political and economic factors
driving reform, variations in the relative priority of decentralization and diversity in the
institutional structures and systems operating when decentralization was initiated.6
With respect to initial goals, it is well established that countries decentralize for various
essentially political reasons.7 In some cases, transition from a military/authoritarian
regime to a more democratic society, as in Argentina and Brazil, included moves to
decentralize. At the same time, some weakly democratic countries, such as Cambodia,
decentralized modestly to reinforce the power of a dominant ruling party. A number of
4

Smoke (forthcoming) reviews the literature on intergovernmental frameworks and provides some
comparative information on a number of developing countries.
5
There is much literature on this trend. A few general synthetic sources include: Litvack, Ahmad and Bird
(1998), World Bank (2000), Bardhan and Mookerjee (2006), Cheema and Rondinelli (2007), Connerly,
Eaton and Smoke (2010), and Martinez-Vazquez and Vaillancourt (2011).
6
See, for example, Atinc, Ndegwa, Taliercio, MacAntony and Mailei (2004) and Beard, Miraftab and
Silver (2008).
7
A range of literature on this topic is reviewed in Connerley, Eaton and Smoke (2010) and Eaton, Kaiser
and Smoke (2011).
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post-conflict, post-crisis or fragile nations, such as South Africa and Uganda, pursued
decentralization to build political credibility and national identity. In some crisis cases,
such as Ethiopia and Indonesia, the main objective was to offset perceived subnational
pressures for state disintegration. The forces driving reform create incentives for system
design and implementation, including planning, in varying ways and at different paces.
Whatever the dominant political motive(s) for decentralization, complete restructuring of
subnational institutions is uncommon. Existing jurisdictions rarely disappear, although
political forces may allow asymmetric empowerment (deconcentration versus
devolution). Even with genuinely transformative reform ambitions, the challenges of
what happens to standing systems and processes can be daunting. Agencies that lose
power from a stronger subnational government role in infrastructure, for example, are
likely to resist scaling back or eliminating deconcentrated planning systems. Thus, the
original (more centralized) planning systems may continue to operate to various degrees
in ways that are inconsistent with their role under decentralization. Moreover, sectoral
ministries may adopt dedicated planning and financing mechanisms for specific services,
sometimes in direct response to decentralization, further complicating coherent planning.
The implications of decentralization for city planning have also varied considerably. In
general, urban jurisdictions, at least larger metropolitan areas, are granted more freedom
and resources, and there have been efforts to promote urban development by improving
local infrastructure planning in broader context.8 Steps to increase discretion and access
to finance (e.g. through municipal development banks and facilitation of access to credit
markets) are often accompanied by accountability and fiscal responsibility reforms.
Urban local authorities, however, remain subject to varying degrees of oversight and
control by national agencies, some of which can be onerous and counteract the forces that
decentralization is supposed to unleash.
In addition to formal public sector planning systems, there has also been a strong trend to
develop community-based planning for small-scale infrastructure in many developing
countries. Initially these were mostly created as parallel systems that bypassed local
governments, often where decentralization had not yet been adopted or was weak or
where crisis situations created a need to get resources to impacted communities quickly.
In some countries these community mechanisms have been more integrated with local
government systems as decentralization reforms evolved, but in other cases they continue
to function as separate systems that plan local infrastructure independently.9
A core practical challenge for infrastructure planning in developing countries has been
that institutional reforms have encountered and generated political and bureaucratic
incentives that allow formal adoption of new systems but hindered their implementation
and fail to motivate adequate modification of existing structures. In addition, planning
reforms have tended to be technical, commonly placing more emphasis on creating
8

New and more integrated approaches to thinking about urban infrastructure planning as part of broadbased, multi-actor city development strategies are discussed in World Bank (2009) and Frank (2011).
9
A synthetic review of the evolution of community driven development and various operational models is
provided in Binswanger-Mkhize, de Regt and Spector (2009).

The Political Economy of Local Infrastructure Planning

7

formal systems than on developing the means, incentives and capacity for the political
connection to constituents that is considered essential for successful decentralization.
III.

Overview of Actors, Institutions and Planning Roles under
Decentralization

A wide range of central actors has a role in designing and implementing the legal and/or
constitutional parameters of decentralization10 that are relevant for infrastructure.
National legislatures can face incentives to promote or inhibit decentralization, and how
this plays out can depend on the degree of political competition. Various government
agencies may have different opinions regarding how far decentralization should go and
what their roles should be relative to local actors. In some cases, central agencies may
face incentives to overtly or covertly obstruct decentralization of major functions,
including infrastructure planning, when this undermines their powers and control over the
often-substantial resources at stake. These agencies may also directly compete for control
of infrastructure provision, and they may pursue policies that are consequentially
inconsistent with the formal intergovernmental framework.
A first step in understanding these bureaucratic incentives is to determine which actors
are involved in the process and what role(s) they play, formally and informally. Whether
local planning systems are independent or integrated, they invariably face national
guidelines and/or oversight. Most countries have an agency dedicated to developing and
supporting local government/administration, such as a Ministry of Local Government,
Home Affairs or Interior. Other agencies manage overall national processes, such as a
Ministry of Finance, Planning, or Public Service. Given the overarching nature of their
functions, they usually have some control over agencies at all levels (except local
governments in federal systems), and they have tendencies towards standardization and
control. The framework and oversight are sometimes managed by the planning ministry
and sometimes by the local government ministry. In cases where more than one system
exists, deconcentrated planning may be managed under the former and local government
(devolved) planning under the latter.
Sectoral ministries also have important responsibilities for infrastructure—roads, water,
etc. Separate sectoral bodies that cross multiple jurisdictions, such as a roads or water
authority, may also be created. In some countries, portions of the infrastructure portfolios
may be coordinated under national agencies with specific mandates, such as a Ministry of
Regional, Rural or Urban Development, or regional development bodies. Sectoral and
territorial agencies are typically oriented towards service delivery, so they are more
concerned about technical inputs and outcomes than about building local institutions and
governance, There are, of course, cases in which central ministries promote
decentralization and local capacity building.
Although the loss of central agency power and inter-agency competition to play
prominent roles provide strong incentives for overtly or covertly obstructive behavior or
10

Much of the relevant literature is synthesized in Connerley, Eaton and Smoke (2010) and Eaton, Kaiser
and Smoke (2011).
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careful institutional positioning, less obvious dynamics can also be at work. Especially in
least developed countries with weak institutions, informal mechanisms for raising and
allocating resources may dominate formal systems. These mechanisms are clientelistic or
patrimonial in nature, and it is difficult for reformers to change long-established rules of
behavior.11 This is particularly prevalent in certain environments, e.g. if transparency is
limited, if informal rules are derivative of or validated by traditional norms or cultural
allegiances, or if low civil service salaries create incentives for staff to extract resources
by whatever means feasible. Even where it is possible to pursue reform under such
circumstances, it is likely to take a long time.
Subnational politics and institutional arrangements
Beyond the behavior of the central government, local institutions and relationships
matter. The most obvious concern is the extent to which elected councils represent their
constituents versus get captured by local elites or higher-level politics. Bureaucratic
dynamics can also matter, for example where decentralization involved assignment of
former central employees to new local governments. In such cases, these employees may
continue to look to national ministries for direction on infrastructure planning rather than
to locally elected councils to which they now formally report. National standards and
some upward accountability justifiably remain important even in decentralized systems,
but downward and horizontal accountability must also be developed and respected for
decentralized planning to create appropriate incentives and realize its intended benefits.12
Some types of devolved or delegated infrastructure services may be more efficiently
delivered across multiple local jurisdictions, so provisions for interjurisdictional
cooperation, such as special districts for specific services or metropolitan planning
commissions that include several contiguous autonomous jurisdictions, can be important.
Such mechanisms may be mandatory (imposed by the central government) or voluntary
(formed at the discretion of the jurisdictions involved). In either case, political dynamics
and embedded incentives affect how the mechanism will operate and perform. For
example, the imposition of a special district may be resisted, and where cooperation is
voluntary there are often issues with how the agreement will be governed by the multiple
jurisdictions (with separately elected councils and separately appointed staff) involved,
and this will have consequences for how it performs in delivering infrastructure.
A few examples can help to illustrate the diversity and importance of metropolitan
governance arrangements (Table 1).13 One model is unified metropolitan administration,
as is practiced in Cape Town, a metropolitan municipality composed of several formerly
distinct local governments. Cape Town prepares, as per national requirements, an
Integrated Development Plan that is partly financed with resources from the central

11

See, for example, discussions of public financial management reform in Malawi (Rakner et. al. 2004) and
public sector revenue reform in Uganda (Fjeldstad 2006).
12
Much of the synthetic literature on this topic is reviewed in Eaton, Kaiser and Smoke (2011), and
Yilmaz, Beris and Serrano-Berthet (2010) provide a thorough overview of subnational accountability.
13
See, for example, Slack (2007), Slack and Chattopadhyay (2009) and Slack (2010).
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government and partly with city resources.14 The Cape Town Partnership (CTP), an
independent non-profit organization linked to the city’s development planning has been
influential in pushing infrastructure development to promote private investment. The
CTP Board of Directors includes private and public sector. Some critics charge that the
CTP and the city in general focus on the central business district and do not sufficiently
take into account other parts of the city, but the integrated political structure and
administration of the city and the broad involvement of key stakeholders seems to lead to
a more effective planning process than occurs in many other metropolitan areas.
In the Philippines, the central government created the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA) to coordinate metropolitan planning and service delivery among the
16 cities and one municipality located in the greater Manila metropolitan region. The
MMDA is not considered very effective—there is a metropolitan plan, but each city tends
to focus on its own needs. Part of the problem is that MMDA is widely seen as a national
agency with roots in the authoritarian Marcos era. Another major problem is the
financial dependence of MMDA on the center. Resources are limited and institutional
arrangements create few incentives or accountability mechanisms to induce individual
city mayors to work beyond their own constituencies for the larger metropolitan good.15

Nairobi has long been government by an elected city council that plans for the territory
under its jurisdiction. Over the years, a number of special service authorities have also
been set up. In 2008 the central government created the Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan
Development (see below), which was intended to coordinate across all local authorities
(including the city council) in the greater metropolitan area.
A very different situation prevails in the greater Cairo region, which incorporates five
contiguous governorates (intermediate tier of Egyptian administration) and eight new
cities.16 Governorates are part of a highly centralized system and have limited authority
14
15

See Darch and Emezi (2012) for more details on Cape Town.
See Nasehi and Rangwala (2011) for more detail on Manila.
16
See Algoso and Magee (2011) for more detail on Cairo.
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unless the governor is politically powerful. New cities were created to attract people
from the Nile Delta to Cairo and have no formal relationship with local administration.
They are overseen by the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development
(MHUUD). Governorates have limited authority and face fragmented planning and
budgeting behavior of central agencies. Prior to the 2011 revolution, governors and new
city managers in the Cairo region began an effort to create a strategic plan for greater
Cairo with support from the MHUUD and donors. What will happen in the evolving
environment remains to be seen, but the lack of a comprehensive plan for the Cairo
region and poor incentives for coordination among component entities and creates great
challenges for infrastructure planning and invites political maneuvering.
These cases illustrate great variation in how metropolitan planning is managed. The
degree of institutional fragmentation, the role of higher level mandates in specific
political environments, the incentives for politicians in separate jurisdictions to work
together (whether from national policies or organic political forces), the existence and
nature of alternative institutions or mechanisms for managing area-wide functions, and
the role of multi-stakeholder partnerships of interested parties, among others, are all
important factors. These arise from specific political economy incentives and can create
further dynamics that can support or undermine coordinated infrastructure planning.
External actors
The role of international development agencies can obviously be important in the
developing world, particularly in aid dependent countries. On the one hand, these
agencies play a vital role. At the same time, they may behave in competitive and
uncoordinated ways that reinforce problematic incentives and behaviors of government
institutions. One agency, for example, may support devolved infrastructure planning
through a Ministry of Planning or Ministry of Local Government, while others promote
more centralized infrastructure planning through individual sectoral ministries (see
below). Such inconsistencies must ultimately be recognized and dealt with if a coherent
and effective infrastructure planning system is to be developed and institutionalized.
IV.

Broader Public Sector and Governance Reforms and Their Impact on
Local Planning

As already suggested, other major public sector reforms, such as public financial
management, civil service, service delivery and community driven development, are also
highly relevant for decentralization. The way these reforms are designed and unfold can
have a major impact on the performance of local infrastructure planning.17 The basic
problem stems from the competitive relationships among national agencies involved in
public sector operations that have incentives to protect their own divergent interests, as
outlined in various ways above. These agencies are often poorly coordinated, and they
are thus relatively free to pursue reforms that are inconsistent with each other. The
situation is exacerbated by the power imbalances among them, and it is reinforced by
17

These issues are discussed and more examples are provided in Smoke (2010) and Eaton, Kaiser and
Smoke (2011).
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international development agencies that too often competitively approach the
programming of their support for public sector and governance reforms.
Friction is common, for example, between the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) or
its equivalent and the Ministry of Finance (MoF). The former commonly (if not always)
seeks to expand the role of local governments and enhance its own relationship to them,
while the latter is often reluctant to relinquish fiscal powers to local governments or
oversight of them to MoLG. In some cases, conflicts stem from MoLG reforms that fail
to meet sound PFM principles that the MoF has a legitimate interest in enforcing for all
public entities. It is, however, often a result of MoF desire to excessively control local
government fiscal behavior. Since the MoLG or equivalent is typically weaker than the
MoF (because of stronger political connections and the power inherent in wielding legal
control over the national budget), the latter often has the upper hand.
The consequences of such a situation can be considerable. If MoF wishes, for example, to
adopt PFM reforms that limit local government access to autonomously programmable
development resources, then local infrastructure planning can be greatly weakened.
Similar dynamics may emerge with other broad-based central agencies, such as a
Ministry of Planning that is developing an unnecessarily centralized planning system or a
Ministry of Public Service that decides to adopt reforms that unduly constrain the ability
of local governments to make sufficiently autonomous staffing decisions.
Other major players in decentralization and in infrastructure specifically are sectoral
ministries, such as a Ministry of Roads and Transport or a Ministry of Water. The dual
impact of their common reluctance to relinquish control over resources and their focus on
service delivery with less concern for local governance and institution building is often
considerable. Sectoral ministries may exert a powerful centralizing tendency either
through heavy management of resources officially devolved to local governments or
through continued planning and delivery of services after their legal devolution. Formal
Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps) promoted by donors often reinforce the incentives of
sectoral ministries to pursue centralizing reforms for service delivery, commonly in
conjunction with national poverty reduction or Millennium Development Goal strategies.
The centralist tendencies of sectoral agencies and their reform programs coincide
conveniently with those of finance and planning agencies, overpowering relatively weak
local government ministries and nascent local governments. Thus, a centralizing MoF
PFM reform that reduces local government fiscal autonomy and simultaneous adoption of
centralizing SWAps in key sectors can effectively neutralize local government
infrastructure planning processes or reduce them to the limited role of providing an
optional input to resource programming decisions effectively controlled by higher levels.
In some cases, however, there can be clashes among the various central actors that impact
local infrastructure planning. Sectoral ministries, for example, may pursue SWAps that
create sector specific systems and procedures for managing services—mechanisms for
channeling resources, special districts distinct from local governments, etc.—that are at
odds with decentralization reforms and formal intergovernmental PFM, development
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planning or civil service systems promoted by other cross-cutting ministries. Even
though relevant overarching ministries should be able to discipline such behavior by
virtue of their legal powers, they may be unable to do so if sectoral ministers have strong
political connections or international development partners, which provide considerable
sectoral resources in aid dependent countries, prefer particular modalities. The result can
be a system of local infrastructure planning and finance with muddled incentives.
Community driven development (CDD)—the umbrella for Social Investment Funds and
other community-based mechanisms discussed below—is another common element of
the governance reform agenda, and it is heavily promoted and supported by donors.
CDD is qualitatively different than other activities discussed here because it is not
primarily a component of public sector reform. Although a centrally based government
or quasi-government agency is normally the national administrator of CDD planning and
financing mechanisms, the resources typically target nongovernmental or community
based organizations with diverse decision-making and accountability mechanisms rather
than popularly elected local governments. CDD is relevant for local infrastructure
planning precisely because it finances small-scale local investments, many of which are
or could be the responsibility of local governments.
In countries where local governments are weak and CDD proponents are more concerned
about community empowerment than public sector reform, CDD—and its dedicated
planning and financing mechanisms—may undermine development of nascent local
government systems. Citizens may come to view local infrastructure as the role of CDD
mechanisms rather than elected local governments. In addition, CDD bodies, unlike local
governments, do not have access to regularized revenue sources.
Together these realities raise concern about the effect of CDD on local accountability, the
linkages between CDD and public investment (particularly for network infrastructure),
and the source of funds required to operate and maintain CDD-financed infrastructure.
All of these could be dealt with by appropriate design features, which might evolve as
local governments become stronger. In many countries, however, CDD continues to use
independent planning and financing systems long after the need for a separate identity
has passed, and this may have nontrivial consequences for local infrastructure planning.
This brief treatment of how various public sector and governance reform efforts may
affect local infrastructure planning cannot do justice to the range of issues involved or the
complexity of the political economy landscape that surround them. The overarching
point, however, is clear. Local infrastructure planning cannot be effectively reformed
independently of other public sector and governance reform initiatives that could either
support or undermine it. The existing and potential relationships among these various
reforms need to be documented, and the incentives of various actors to cooperate or
obstruct improved local development planning needs to be understood.
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An Illustrative Cautionary Case

The evolution of development planning in Kenya illustrates the challenges created by
political economy forces in the type of complex intergovernmental and multi-actor
environment outlined above.18 The county has produced medium-term national plans and
subnational land use plans since the colonial era, although they evolved in purpose and
form as international conventions and local conditions changed. At the subnational level,
there is a bifurcated system of planning and budgeting that reflects a dichotomy between
the deconcentrated and hierarchical provincial-district system and the semi-autonomous
elected local authority system. The former was strengthened and the latter weakened after
independence.19 The post-colonial favoring of deconcentration was officially justified as
means to build national unity in the ethnically diverse nation with competing visions of
the role of central government, but critics saw an effort by the dominant tribal group and
its political party to build a unitary state that was under their control.
National development planning conducted under the authority of the Ministry of Planning
and National Development (MPND) reaches down to administrative units at provincial
and district level, which are under the Office of the President. Provincial and District
Development Plans are prepared under MPND field staff. The subnational process occurs
concurrently with the national process, such that it neither flows directly from nor truly
influences the national plan. The politically motivated creation of many new districts has
diluted infrastructure funds and staff in individual districts and compromised planning.
Although a major share of line ministry resources flows through provincial and district
budgets, some ministries maintain separate sectoral planning activities and/or set up
dedicated regions/mechanisms (e.g in water and roads) for public services under their
jurisdiction. These may support better investments (this has not been well studied), but
there is often inadequate coordination with districts and local governments that may also
be active in the sector. This can be a problem if these local actors face no incentives to
assume the burden of operating and maintaining infrastructure not planned by them.
The linkage of the planning to the annual budgeting process in the deconcentrated system
is weak, and involvement of citizens or their elected representatives is limited. Decisions
are made by District Development Committees (DDCs) chaired by a presidential
appointee. District staff of national ministries dominates DDCs, with only a few members
from local governments and NGOs. This system emerged under the District Focus for
Rural Development Strategy (DFRD) of 1983, a reform framed as returning “power to
the people” in response to a 1982 coup d’etat attempt. Critics saw DFRD as reinforcing
ruling party control and further weakening local government performance incentives.
The local government planning system is fully separate. The Ministry of Local
Governent (MLG) initiated Local Authority Development Plans (LADPs) in the 1980s to
program donor funds for local investments, and they were often poorly linked to physical
development plans (mostly prepared by the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Physical
18
19

The country case is discussed more fully in Smoke (2003), Smoke (2008) and Smoke and Whimp (2012).
The system is summarized in Cohen and Peterson (1999) and Republic of Kenya (2005).
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Planning). As with DDPs, LADPs were poorly linked to local budgets, and popular
participation mechanisms were weak. A Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan
(LASDAP) initiated in 2000 to allocate resources from a new transfer fund provided a
partial linkage to the local budget and mandated participatory planning. This process has
essentially replaced the LADP. As with districts, many new local authorities have been
created for political reasons, further compromising infrastructure planning and provision.
In addition to resources provided through the provincial-district and local government
systems, the government operates (under MPND, the same ministry responsible for
provincial and district planning) a mechanism for planning and financing community
driven development at levels below district administration and local governments through
the Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF). Substantial small-scale rural
infrastructure is provided through CDTF. Coordination with district planning and local
government planning is ad hoc and varies greatly across jurisdictions.
Finally, the Kenyan Parliament created a Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in 2003
with the stated purpose of fighting poverty by improving basic services.20 Rather than try
to fix existing systems, the Members of Parliament opted to find another way to channel
resources for local service delivery—one that served their political interests. There is now
a planning process associated with CDF funds, but its link to other planning processes is
ad hoc and generally weak. In recent budgets, an increasing proportion of resources under
other programs have also been allocated on a constituency basis.21
In larger urban areas, the role of the district planning system is limited, but the process
for coordinating infrastructure is also relatively ad hoc. There has, however, been one
move to respond to the problems of fragmented urban planning. In 2008 the government
created the Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development (MNMD) as part of the
process of implementing Vision 2030, Kenya’s latest development strategy. The mission
of the MNMD is to ensure that the various jurisdictions work together so as “to manage
the Nairobi Metropolis by providing sustainable infrastructural services and high quality
of life to all its residents, visitors and investors” (http://www.nairobimetro.go.ke/).
Figure 1 summarizes the development planning systems in Kenya. All five of the
existing planning/finance channels—sectoral, provincial/district, local government,
constituency and community—have some role in local infrastructure provision. While
this situation is not necessarily undesirable, a number of consequential problems are
evident. First, there is extensive territorial overlap among the jurisdictions covered by
these various systems, and this has been exacerbated by the above-noted creation of new
districts and local governments. Second, there is considerable lack of clarity about
specific infrastructure responsibilities across them. Third, each of the planning systems is
financed by different sources. Fourth, each system has its own political economy
incentives and dynamics, and these inevitably come into conflict. Finally, given these
concerns, the various plans and finance mechanisms are largely uncoordinated, and any
20

Constituency Development Fund Act, Government of Kenya Law No. 10 of 2003.
For example, a percentage of funding for rural roads earmarked through the Road Maintenance Levy
Fund is allocated by constituency.
21
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coordination that occurs is ad hoc rather than systematic. Other public sector reform
efforts—public financial management, civil service and sectoral—have largely ignored or
constrained all but the deconcentrated system.
Collectively, these structural and procedural issues have major consequences. First, they
generate redundancies and gaps in infrastructure provision. Second, accountability is
compromised since citizens are unclear about which actor is responsible for specific
infrastructure. Third, lack of functional clarity, fragmentation of resources, and muddled
accountability create incentives and opportunities for political dynamics and bureaucratic
behavior that undermine efficient use of public resources. Although Kenya may be a
relatively extreme case, such problems are not uncommon in developing countries.

Recent political developments and deterioration of government performance created
conditions for a new constitution (2010) that will dramatically alter the intergovernmental
system. Mandated reforms consolidate hundreds of districts and local authorities into 47
newly empowered county governments. This should allow the eventual creation of a
more integrated infrastructure planning and finance system, although to date there is little
clarity on how the fragmented planning systems will be integrated in the new institutional
landscape.
Many lessons can be derived from the Kenya case, but the principal point for current
purposes is the importance of documenting the larger institutional context in which
infrastructure planning is taking place. This context is in great part created by political
economy dynamics. Once the various institutions and associated planning systems are
created, they are each subject to their own internal political economy influences and the
political economy interrelationships that exist and develop among them. Without an
understanding of this context and the underlying and evolving political economy
dynamics, efforts to improve local infrastructure planning are unlikely to succeed.
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VI.

How Decentralization Reforms Shape Subnational Planning

The previous sections have outlined the larger context of local infrastructure planning.
This section and the next one focus more specifically on how decentralization reforms
shape subnational planning systems and then on how such systems may affect local
infrastructure outcomes. The logic of the argument is summarized in Figure 3. The main
context of our discussion is that of aid-dependent least developed countries (LDC), where
decentralization reforms involve major efforts to get the very basic systems in place and
international development partners may play a significant role in supporting such efforts.
Figure 3: Decentralization Reforms and Local Infrastructure Outcomes
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The extent to which decentralization reforms institute an effective subnational
development planning system depends on the design of the reforms and ultimately on the
political rationale and bureaucratic incentives behind their implementation. We have
already stressed the centrality of domestic politics for initiating and sustaining
decentralization reforms and the role of bureaucratic incentives in explaining their
incomplete and fragile implementation. But it is also important to stress is that this is an
inherently contested and dynamic process which continues to open (and close) space for
action by domestic reformers and for supportive engagement by their international
development partners22. Moreover, as argued elsewhere23, understanding the dynamic
nature of the process is only the first step; it must then be followed by an analytical shift
that places less emphasis on the contribution decentralization may make to a global
democratization and good governance agenda and better understanding decentralization
reforms as part of a domestic “developmental state-building” agenda. 24 Such an
approach goes beyond recognizing that decentralization is driven by politics and asks the
22

The case for more strategic and diversified, engagement of external aid in support of decentralization
reforms, in a variety of developing countries contexts, is made in Ojendal (2010) Weimer (2009), Romeo
(2003), Romeo and ElMensi (2011), Romeo (forthcoming),
23
Romeo (forthcoming)
24
The need for a more realistic “good-enough” governance agenda in international development is
elaborated in Grindle (2004) and its relation to the developmental state building agenda is highlighted in
Fritz and Menochal (2006) and Fritz and Menochal (2007).
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critical question of whether it coexists with, or relates to, a developmental state-building
project, an understanding of the potential of local development within it, and a related
commitment to effective subnational planning. This raises two general observations on
the potential for decentralization to develop effective local planning.
First, the weaker the link between the immediate political objectives of reform and a
larger project of developmental statebuilding, the less likely that effective subnational
development planning will ever emerge. Without a developmental underpinning in the
very nature of the state, the formal addition of subnational planning to the national
system of public resource management is bound to remain cosmetic, and a genuine
transition from a centralized (hierarchical) to a decentralized (multi-level /negotiated)
national planning system is likely to be blocked. Second, even where decentralization
reforms are linked to developmental statebuilding25, an effective subnational planning
system ultimately depends on a proper understanding of the nature and role of local
development within national development efforts and therefore on the scope and degree
of autonomy enjoyed by subnational authorities. We return below to common
misconceptions regarding local development and local autonomy as key obstacles for
genuinely decentralized development planning. Figure 4 summarizes these key
relationships between decentralization reforms and effective subnational planning.
Figure 4: From Decentralization Reforms to Decentralized Development Planning
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Evans (1995), and Leftwich (1995) contrast the “developmental state” model (whether democratic or
authoritarian) with the “predatory” state model. The most general distinction is not the role of the state in
the appropriation and intra-elite distribution of rents (as this is common to both models to secure political
stability and prevent intra-elite conflicts) but rather the priority given by the developmental state to the
expansion of the economic base from which rents can then be extracted and its relative or “embedded”
autonomy (Evans 1995) from internal and external interests, in fostering such expansion.
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Beyond such generalizations, a more detailed assessment of how the design and
implementation of politics-driven decentralization reforms affects the practice of
decentralized development planning requires looking at four basic dimensions of a
national decentralization policy. These include (i) changes in the architecture of the
governance and public administration system, (ii) reassignment of functions across the
system, (iii) reassignment of fiscal powers and financial resources and associated changes
in public finance management, and (iv) changes in human resource management
responsibilities among levels. Together these four dimensions provide a framework for
assessing the transition from centralized to decentralized development planning and
understanding actual arrangements occurring in diverse country contexts. Figure 5
summarizes these dimensions and selected issues they raise for subnational planning.
Figure 5: Dimensions of Decentralization Reform Subnational Planning Systems
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Architecture of subnational governance and decentralized development planning
Decentralization reforms introduce changes in the architecture of the subnational
governance and public administration system, including in (i) tiers of local authorities
and their mutual relationships, (ii) the degree of autonomy, (iii) internal structures and
accountability relations, (iv) mechanisms for joint action, and (v) the national system for
support and supervision. Issues with any of these elements impact the performance of
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subnational planning systems. Definitive analysis must be country specific, but there are
typical problems, some of which have been the subject of extensive literature.
The first issue is that of the “right size” of a local authority. Smaller jurisdictions, often
established as first-tier units, may lack the functional and fiscal capacity to be viable
planning units. On the other hand, larger (provincial/ regional) jurisdictions are
inadequate as units of “local” development planning, if “local” is properly understood as
leveraging a territorial identity and mobilizing community resources, including social
capital. Assigning local planning responsibilities to units whose functions and capacities
are severely constrained by their size, or assigning them to large units that lack the
comparative advantage to promote territory-specific solutions and to mobilize community
resources, may lead to costly inefficiencies (more below).
The multiplication of subnational government tiers can also be problematic. For
example, intermediate authorities can be critical for an effective public sector and they
are core actors in federal systems. In unitary systems with weak capacity and governance,
however, they may receive autonomy prematurely or inappropriately. Stronger regional
levels of administration may facilitate coordination of central and local government plans
and action, but their political empowerment in emerging systems may complicate
cooperation between elected national and local governments as well as constrain or
undermine the role of the latter.26 In many cases, autonomous local government planning
and stronger central-local government partnerships could be better supported by
deconcentrating the state than by creating intermediate political authorities.27
The most critical issue for establishing genuine decentralized planning is the degree of
autonomy assigned to emerging local authorities. Whether the goal is to improve national
program efficiency or to develop local policies and mobilize resources, it is ultimately the
extent of their autonomy, understood as powers of initiative and immunity from higher
levels controls (Clark, 1984) that may generate locally “added value” to centralized
development efforts. Yet a quarter of a century into the latest wave of decentralization,
local autonomy remains highly contested in theory and highly constrained in practice in
many LDCs. Politics-driven decentralization reforms may create new subnational
political bodies but mostly rearrange administrative and fiscal powers within the central
administration rather than support local autonomy in making and implementing local
plans, programs and budgets. This reduces subnational planning to a marginally valuable
technical exercise with weak or no linkage with the political agenda of local councils.

26

This is particularly the case in decentralizing unitary states where the basic principle of “nonsubordination” of one local authority to another is systematically violated and lower council decisions
(plans and budgets) are subject to approval by higher levels. True local plans are relatively independent and
realize synergies and complementarities through negotiation among multiple autonomous entities (local
authorities at different levels and national and deconcentrated agencies). If higher level approval is
required, local plans remain components of hierarchically organized regional plans, ultimately to be
integrated into a single plan and budget, as would occur in any unreformed, centralized planning system.
27
Yet experience shows that it is easier for the initiators of politics-driven decentralization reforms to
create a new provincial/regional council than to deconcentrate the state administration at those levels and
direct it to support and cooperate with lower-level local authorities.
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The disconnect between the political activity of the local elective councils and the
preparation of local development plans, programs and budgets is compounded by the
structural problems of weak accountability of local executives and administrations often
created by politics-driven decentralization reforms. As already suggested, the prime
objective of such reforms is to legitimize national government action at the periphery
and/or to consolidate and diffuse the networks of political patronage of the party in
power, and not necessarily to share development and service delivery responsibilities
with autonomous subnational actors. As a result, the reforms stop short of establishing
genuine local authorities with their own executive and administrative structures. To the
extent that newly created councils cannot develop and implement their own plans, their
role is reduced to approving subnational plans prepared and implemented by centrallycontrolled administrative agents, which at best “localize” national policies.
Another concern is that political disincentives and technical complexities make multilevel intergovernmental cooperation difficult. Once a multi-level governance and
administration system is set up, formerly hierarchical relations among layers of a
centralized administration should be replaced by “negotiated” arrangements between
relatively autonomous public entities, as well as between them and community and
private sector actors. Yet central-local cooperation remains elusive in decentralizing
LDCs. In particular, contractual delegation arrangements28, which can facilitate gradual
and selective decentralization of service responsibilities, have proven difficult to devise.
And, contrary to common perceptions, the problem has often been as much or more one
of bureaucratic disincentives and weak capacity of central agencies to structure and
manage such contracts than lack of capacity of local authorities to implement them.
Finally subnational planning systems are affected by confusion and conflicts about whom
in central government should regulate, support and supervise their operation. As noted
above, various key national ministries have dissimilar attitudes towards decentralization,
and often opposing views on the scope and modalities of subnational planning. The
consequences are multiple requirements and confusing guidelines that overwhelm rather
than build the limited capacity of local government planning units.
Functional assignments and decentralized development planning
The scope and outcomes of subnational planning are obviously affected by what
functions are devolved or delegated to local authorities. Lack of clarity makes it difficult
for local governments to structure administration around specific responsibilities and link
local development plans to the operations and budgets of their departments. As a result,
subnational planning ends up being disconnected not only from the local political
process, but also from the organization and daily work of the local administration.
Beyond the effects of inadequate functional assignments, the quality of subnational plans
and operations are also negatively affected by the inability of local authorities to fully
28

These differ from either deconcentration or outright devolution arrangements and require contractual
agreements by which local authorities make use of meaningful discretion to improve the delivery efficiency
of central services for which the “contracting” central agency retains primary responsibility.
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espouse and operationalize their own “general mandate” for local development, which is
often provided for in decentralization legal frameworks29. Where decentralization reforms
neither reassign specific services delivery functions nor support the adoption of a service
delivery agenda under a general mandate, subnational planning ends up focusing on
stand-alone, small-scale infrastructure projects. These projects are seen as the easiest,
least controversial, highest political return, options, as need not be aligned with mandated
functions and do not require potentially controversial, political deliberations about which
service delivery operations local authorities should engage in by their own initiative.
Subnational finances and decentralized development planning
Ultimately, local planning systems are shaped by how local authorities are financed and
local finances are managed. All too often politics-driven reforms create subnational
authorities but fall short of empowering them with the full range of fiscal and financial
instruments needed to perform developmental functions. The situation differs from
country to country, and, within countries, between larger urban areas and less endowed
rural jurisdictions, but most local authorities in LDCs typically suffer from: limited scope
or capacity for own source revenue raising; legal or de facto exclusion from credit
financing; lack of specialized national institutions supporting subnational capital
spending, and inadequate mechanisms for contractual financing of delegated functions.
The primary source of financing for local development plans, (and only incentive to
pursue subnational planning), has often been grants from central government. These have
been provided as more or less discretionary resources, either as part of a regular transfer
system, or from more ad hoc and externally financed facilities 30. The bulk of these
grants have been spent on small-scale infrastructure, either because funds have been
earmarked for that purpose by central governments or donors, or because infrastructure
spending has been the default option for local authorities for the reasons suggested above.
Thus, in many decentralizing LDCs, subnational planning systems have been largely
shaped by various central grant mechanisms. Importantly, where these grants have been
introduced as regular transfers for local budgets support, this has facilitated the adoption
of statutory procedures for local planning programming and budgeting. By contrast,
where grants have come from specific project-financing facilities, this has often been
associated with the introduction of ad hoc, rather demanding31 and less sustainable,
planning exercises essentially meant to allocate the resources of the financing facility.
National mechanisms to transfer resources for subnational development spending and the
donor-supported facilities (i.e. Local Development Funds–LDFs—and similar programs)
that have often piloted or complemented them, have played important roles in the
29

This point is often missed in the fiscal decentralization literature, where functional assignment is
understood as the offloading to local governments of functions formerly provided by higher levels.
30
Donors-supported facilities of the first type include Local Development Funds (LDF) and similar local
budget-supporting mechanisms, while examples of the second type include the Social Funds and numerous
other sub-national project-financing facilities
31
This is particularly true in terms of mechanisms for popular participation in local government decisionmaking
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emergence of sustainable subnational planning systems in LDCs. By providing a
minimum of locally programmable resources to emerging local authorities they have
helped break the vicious circle of “no capacity-no responsibilities-no resources,” put local
authorities on a “learning-by-doing” path of institutional development, and facilitated the
local adoption of statutory and participatory development planning processes.32
Yet if decentralization reforms remain incomplete and do not proceed to functional
reassignments and diversification of financing instruments, the LDF-type regular (and
necessarily modest) annual transfers end up being stretched much beyond their original
function of creating incentives for local planning and management capacity-building, and
they become the primary or only source for local infrastructure financing. We elaborate
below on how this affects the type and quality of local infrastructure. Here we simply
note that this modality has another effect on local planning: it often involves less rigorous
investment appraisal procedures than those used by an independent financing facility.
Local authority human resources and decentralized development planning
Effective local development planning requires capabilities that are typically scarce in
developing countries. Necessary skills, particularly for strategic and participatory
planning, are difficult to embed in bureaucratic routines and are not easy to develop in the
first place since they depend more on experience than on specialized training. In other
words, effective subnational planning requires not only technical skills that people can be
trained in, but also learning how to think strategically through experience. Similarly,
participatory planning training will neither make local governments participatory nor turn
their constituents into active citizens, which require learning from working together.
Incomplete decentralization reforms often hamper development of subnational planning
capacity, as they do not effectively address the need for local planning professionals or
develop regulations to allow local authorities to flexibly source planning skills in the
professional services market. But even with fuller reforms, complete reliance of local
authorities on private consultants would neither be desirable nor feasible because their
effective use requires local authority capacity to manage their services and link them to
both the political work of local councils and the organization of local administration.
Returning to the core rationale of sub-national planning: local development
The above review of how politics-driven, incomplete decentralization impacts local
planning systems underscores a basic point. Effective development planning depends on
the extent to which decentralization reforms, beyond their potential to foster good local
governance, support local development and its role in a developmental state agenda.

32

See UNCDF (1996). An early discussion of the role of LDFs as tools for local capacity building and
initial steps in support of decentralized planning and financing is in Romeo (1999).
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As we argue elsewhere33 the adjective “local” in “local development” refers not only to
the where, but also and most importantly to the who and how of development promotion.
Development is local if it is endogenous, open and incremental, that is: if it makes use of
locality-specific resources, combines them with national/global resources and brings
them to bear on national development as additional benefits in a positive sum game.
Understood in this more specific sense, local development could be an integral part of the
developmental state agenda and the object of a supportive national policy with a status
similar to that of more conventional macro-economic and industrial policies. The
principal instrument for its implementation would be a subnational planning system in
which local authorities mobilize local resources and negotiate their joint use with state
and civil society resources. Unfortunately, generic views of local development (as
development that happens locally) continue to prevail, missing comparative advantages
of local government and the developmental rationale of decentralization. This is seen in
common “decentralization without autonomy” reforms, which set up subnational
planning systems that “localize” national plans, but fail to generate genuine local plans or
mobilize additional resources from civil society and private sector.
VII.

Subnational Planning and Infrastructure Development Outcomes

We now turn to the question of how subnational planning systems set up by politicsdriven and incomplete decentralization reforms affect infrastructure outcomes. It is
important to note that, no matter what drives decentralization and how far it proceeds, the
scope for decentralizing infrastructure provision remains limited not just by technical and
economic factors, but also and more importantly, by core political economy issues.
The scope for decentralizing infrastructure
As noted above, local authorities in many decentralizing LDCs end up spending most of
their (limited) discretionary resources on stand-alone small-scale infrastructure projects
This is the default option when incomplete reforms and political disincentives for local
councilors prevent broader responsibilities for service delivery from being assigned to or
claimed by emerging local authorities. The relative surge in local infrastructure spending
at the early stages of decentralization is, therefore, more of a necessary corollary (a sort
of price to pay) than an intended policy objective. It occurs as larger scale infrastructure
remains centralized and no responsibilities for any infrastructure are formally devolved.
The “pooling” of smaller infrastructure projects (for water, rural roads, rural
electrification) into larger centrally managed programs also continues to be widespread.
Central management of larger scale infrastructure programs that “pool” smaller-scale
ones is often justified on technical-economic grounds (network integrity, high capital
requirements, economies of scale, interjurisdictional benefits). Powerful political
economy realities, however, are often equally or more important. In fact, the management
of infrastructure is a notoriously “‘wet’ area of government”, offering great opportunities
for illicit generation of funds that are critical to political parties in power (Booth and
33

For a more extensive discussion of the role of local development as driver of decentralization reforms
and the limits of “decentralization without autonomy” processes see Romeo (forthcoming)
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Golooba-Mutebi 2009). These funds are used to extend patronage networks and effect the
intra-elite distribution of rents, which are essential for managing risks of violent conflicts
between elite factions and maintaining political stability, a common need in “limited
access” political systems prevailing in less developed countries (North, et al. 2006). The
extraction of funds, in turn, requires “well-oiled machines” (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi
2009) that may be easier to control as units of central agencies than as multiple local
administration departments. Unless the center can extract rents through local authorities
while controlling their distribution and containing the risk of “runaway local elites”, more
decentralization of infrastructure responsibility is unlikely. Within these constraints, the
situation differs across countries, depending on whether decentralization also has a
developmental rationale and if a role is seen for local development, as well as on political
forces and dynamics that launching reforms unleashes.
If accelerated economic growth is critical to sustain creating and distributing rents,
decentralizing regimes may go beyond purely predatory logic to combine a political
rationale for reform with a developmental one. If the potential of local development is
recognized, there may be a shift of resources to local authorities and more decentralized
provision of infrastructure. Reforms may also open space for emerging political actors
(within and outside dominant coalitions) to champion local development as an integral
part of a developmental state agenda and eventually push for greater local autonomy in
managing infrastructure. Thus, political and institutional environments may evolve and
redefine roles of the multiple actors involved in local infrastructure, creating mechanisms
for their interaction and shaping the political and personal incentives they face.
These environments can be distinguished by how they institutionalize and regulate the
main stages of the infrastructure project cycle, namely: (i) planning, (ii) financing and
(iii) implementation. Actors whose incentives are shaped by these environments include
national politicians from the locality, local councilors, local executives and staff, state
agents operating locally, technical service providers, construction firms, communitybased contractors, materials and equipment suppliers, laborers, and infrastructure users.
We selectively review their positioning and incentives in response to the regulatory and
institutional framework for local infrastructure set by decentralization reforms.
Planning local infrastructure
Where decentralization reforms are driven by politics and fail to define local authority
developmental responsibilities and autonomy, local politicians (councilors) essentially
serve as agents of national political forces and are under pressure to pursue the goals of
their patrons: legitimizing the party in power and extending its influence at the periphery.
They therefore seek to both maximize the transfers they spend (as this is linked to their
status with the party), and make the best political use of resources from the perspective of
their central patrons. They have little incentive to link infrastructure spending to locally
owned policies or service delivery agendas. Local planning exercises then result in a list
infrastructure investments that are neither derived from locally owned development
strategies nor support independent work programs of local administration departments.
Such lists typically give preference to projects that are not politically controversial and
spread benefits in the widest possible way. Rural roads construction in Cambodia is a
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typical example. Another example from Bangladesh is the fragmentation of limited
investable local authority funds into multiple micro-projects under “one community, one
project” schemes, primarily conceived as labor-intensive local employment programs.
The selected infrastructure projects may or may not respond to real local priorities, and
may or may not represent value for money. While there are few systematic ex-post
evaluations, most donor accounts and rapid surveys of beneficiaries tend to be positive.34
Thus, local communities seem to appreciate such projects, and they generally cost less
than estimated, even if issues of quality and implementation often arise (see below).
Although these projects are not necessarily wasteful, it is hard to imagine they represent
the best use of scarce local resources. Credible ex-ante appraisal is typically missing from
subnational planning processes, not only because of local capacity limitations, but also,
because local politicians have few incentives to let independent appraisal potentially
constrain their political decision-making. Thus, local infrastructure investments are often
selected through a subnational planning process that is not informed by technical or
financial analysis, and investment decisions are ultimately driven by the urgency to spend
immediately available resources on popular projects with widespread benefits.
More generally, subnational planning processes introduced by politics-driven,
incomplete, decentralization reforms, do not provide local politicians with incentives to
align local capital programming and infrastructure investment decisions with either
strategic planning or operational budgeting. As a result they may overlook larger, more
complex projects that support a local strategic development vision but require greater
efforts over a multi-year horizon to build partnerships and mobilize additional resources.
They may also overlook smaller investments that build the capacity of their own
administration to deliver certain services (and perhaps realize contributions from users).
Beyond shaping incentives of local politicians, how subnational planning is framed also
determines how deconcentrated agents based in the locality will participate in local
planning and contribute to shape infrastructure outcomes. In many LDCs, local
authorities remain embryonic, and deconcentrated agents are expected to help them carry
out their functions. However, even when overseen by a strong governor (or similar state
agent), who should coordinate and clear actions with elected councils, deconcentrated
agents remain weakly accountable to these councils and have little incentive to transfer
responsibilities to them or build their capacity. Instead they are often keen to recapture
decentralized functions and resources for the center. In fact local planning may play an
instrumental role in this respect if no distinction is made between multi-stakeholder
jurisdiction-wide strategic planning35 and local authority corporate strategic planning.36
When this is the case, deconcentrated agencies may heavily influence or formulate plans
of emerging local authorities. After the creation of district local authorities in Cambodia,
34

Abrams (2008) and Romeo and Spyckerelle (2004) assess local infrastructure investments funded by the
Commune/Sangkat Fund (CSF) and Commune Infrastructure Development Fund (CIDF) of Cambodia.
35
Jurisdiction-wide strategic planning aims at developing a shared vision among multiple actors (public,
private and community) operating in the locality, providing the basis for negotiations among them and
guiding the preparation of each of their planning, programming and budgeting instruments.
36
For a review of the difference between, community or jurisdiction-wide strategic planning facilitated by
local governments and the statutory instruments of their corporate planning, see Cities Alliance (2006).
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for example, these agencies came to see local planning as a way to capture resources of
new district authorities to finance investments they could not afford with their own
budgets. State-appointed governors, who act as chief executives of local councils, also
have incentives to support this view of local planning, which strengthens their role vis-avis local councils both as local development managers and policy makers. This scenario
is common in countries experiencing the “decentralization without autonomy” discussed
above. The result is localized national plans37 that local elected councils are pushed to
endorse as part of a wider effort to legitimize the central government in the periphery.
The infrastructure investments generated by this type of subnational planning system may
be more service delivery oriented and less “free-standing” than those selected by
councilors operating as political party agents in the locality, and they do often have a
stronger link to sectoral agendas. But the technicians who formulate these projects may
not face incentives to seek input from beneficiaries or to conduct proper technical and
financial appraisal. The risk of costly technical error is low for “off-the-shelf” projects
with standard designs (e.g. education, health care, administrative facilities), but it may
rise for projects requiring site-specific assessment and careful management (e.g.
irrigation, water supply, flood control). In addition, local agents of technical ministries
tend to give less attention to non-engineering aspects of projects, including institutional,
social, financial or economic feasibility and risks, which are critical for sustainability.
Subnational planning systems designed to localize national plans may also lead to a suboptimal use of local authority resources, as pressures to give each sector a share of the
programmable funds may reinforce the loss of a strategic territorial perspective. Overall,
such planning systems do not take advantage of the potential efficiency gains expected
when autonomous local governments formulate their own development strategies and
negotiate their financing and implementation users and the local private sector.
Financing local infrastructure
Local infrastructure planning is driven by financing, and, as noted above, the structure
and outcomes of local planning systems depends on available financing instruments38. In
many LDCs, where the local authorities’ ability to raise own source revenue or access
credit are limited, infrastructure spending depends on intergovernmental transfers, often
piloted and/or supplemented by externally funded LDF-type facilities. Through formulabased annual block grants, often with access conditions and performance criteria
attached, these provide programmable resources that support a local development
planning process. There may be a list of allowable or prohibited uses, but generally the
transfer criteria are not meant to assess the developmental relevance of the infrastructure
investments. This is left to how local councils strike a balance between advancing the
interests of their local constituencies and serving the political objectives of their national
patrons. This in turn depends on whether local authorities, both individually (through
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Genuinely local plans reflect the agenda of a local authority and mobilize the resources of a local polity.
The main instruments include: (i) own source revenue; (ii) discretionary and conditional development
transfers, (iii) specialized development finance windows (Municipal Development Funds, Social Funds)
(iv) access to the capital market (municipal bonds, bank loans) and (v) direct access to international aid.
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strong local leadership) and collectively (through independent national associations)
eventually emerge as relatively autonomous political actors on the national scene.
Resources transferred annually through LDF-type facilities are relatively small and may
have to go back to the national treasury if unspent during the fiscal year, so they can only
finance infrastructure projects that are very small, simple and quick. This reinforces the
local political bias towards fragmented use of resources to maximize the number of
beneficiary communities. If the fragmentation bias is resisted and attempts are made to
invest in a large project that costs more than the annual LDF allocation (e.g. road link or
water reservoir), the resulting implementation delay may reduce efficiency of resources
allocated to the project by immobilizing capital, increasing costs and delaying benefits.
Political and bureaucratic obstacles also work against the decentralized planning and
financing of larger, more strategic infrastructure projects and the leveraging of LDF
resources through co-financing arrangements with central agencies. Local politicians may
be unable to effectively interact with the central administration or are reluctant to lose
control of the project. More commonly, central agents, in the absence of national
instructions and guidance, may resist venturing into the new and at least somewhat more
complex arrangements necessary for co-providing infrastructure with local authorities.
Other limitations also affect the degree to which LDF resources can be leveraged by
mobilizing private and community resources for co-provision of services and related
infrastructure (e.g.: pre-school/primary education, water supply, sanitation, transport).
This critically depends on the quality of local leaders and the actual (and perceived)
degree of their autonomy.39 The emergence of proactive, development-minded local
leaders is often hindered by the politics-driven decentralization reforms discussed above.
In general, where “pay-as-you-go” through LDF-style annual transfers is the only option
available to local authorities for infrastructure finance, larger, more efficient investments
are rejected in favor of smaller and/or less viable projects. Alternatively, their
implementation may be split over several years, increasing costs and delaying benefits.40
In principle, the limitations of annual general-purpose block grants could be overcome by
establishing dedicated facilities that provide project-specific grants or loans for larger and
more strategic investments. The main examples include Municipal Development Funds
(MDF), many of which have been established with substantial external aid. Social
Investment Funds (SIF) and to some extent Community Driven Development (CDD)
programs, could be counted among such facilities if they can be used to support local
authority investment programs. The design of these facilities has been heavily influenced
by donors and has created specific incentives and disincentives for local actors.
39

Many factors contribute to the emergence of effective local leaders. A most important one however is
whether or not the local electoral system allows voters to express individual preferences.
40
Unfinished infrastructure projects and long implementation delays that retard benefits and inflate costs
can occur for multiple reasons, but they are likely to be more pervasive and problematic where full funding
of the investments cannot be secured upfront and the only available funding is from annual (typically
modest and often volatile) central transfers. The authors observed the effects of this scenario almost two
decades ago in Vietnam, where many unfinished district-level rural infrastructure projects with substantial
“sunk costs” that could rarely be “rescued” by additional investments.
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Conceived as specialized domestic financial institutions to extend concessional credit to
local authorities, MDFs have run into difficulties and the original expectations of their
proponents had to be scaled down.41 Many MDFs could only assist a limited number of
creditworthy urban/metropolitan authorities. Smaller urban and rural authorities could not
generate revenue streams to service debts for non-revenue generating infrastructure.
Many local authorities, hamstrung by national regulations and low internal capacity, have
been reluctant or unable to borrow even for revenue-generating infrastructure. The use of
intergovernmental transfer intercept mechanisms for MDF loans created a moral hazard
and disincentive for proper financial appraisal of investments. Opportunities arose for
local politicians to shift resources from future service delivery and operation and
maintenance spending to the immediately visible bricks–and–mortar projects they prefer
without transparent justification of welfare enhancement or poverty targeting.
By using capital grants SIFs avoid some difficulties of MDFs and can be key vehicles for
financing subnational investment. In contrast to MDFs, SIFs were not born to finance
local authority investment, but to support national pro-poor policies through delivering
community-level social infrastructure (schools, clinics and water and sanitation). SIFs
were also intended to disburse large amounts of external aid rapidly. As the types and
quantities of SIF-eligible investments could not be generated quickly enough through
existing local authority systems, SIFs introduced parallel planning processes. Initially
these simply involved eliciting direct requests from communities informed of SIF
resources (“first come first served”), but they were later replaced by participatory
planning processes carried out in communities targeted by the SIF.
Given their different nature, SIF-driven and local authority planning systems may
generate different investment priorities even if they both finance schools, clinics and
water systems.42 This is because the SIF offers local authorities an opportunity to shape
the local content of a national infrastructure program, not necessarily to finance their own
local priorities. The SIF also does not provide local authorities with incentives to assume
greater responsibilities or to reflect them in local budgets, as the management of most of
the SIF-financed facilities remains under the concerned sectoral ministries.
Political economy analyses of SIF operations in Latin America43 have shown that the
allocation of SIF resources to specific localities is often driven by political/electoral
calculations and that the bulk of SIF resources were spent on technically simple
infrastructure, often with off-the-shelf designs, which could be quickly delivered. This
was justified by the original emergency response mandate of the SIF, but the bias for the
quick and simple persisted because of the preferences of both local politicians and
international aid agencies. As a consequence, the diversification of SIF investments has
been slow and halfhearted, and spending on projects less amenable to standardized
designs (e.g. water supply and sanitation) has remained relatively minor in SIF portfolios.
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For an assessment of the different priorities revealed by the community-level micro-planning process
introduced by the Social Fund and the municipal planning exercises in Nicaragua, see Romeo (2000).
43
See Schady (2000) and Penfold-Becerra (2006).
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Beyond dedicated mechanisms for budget or project support from treasury or specific
central agencies and programs, issuing bonds remains a potentially appropriate option for
local authorities. Experience, however, suggests that the development of a sub-sovereign
bond market depends on conditions that require relatively advanced levels of national
development and local autonomy and must be sustained by a national policy recognizing
the role of local development for national growth. These generally include a supporting
regulatory environment, a diversified financial sector and an increased capacity for debt
support and management by local authorities.44 Such conditions exist widely only in
advanced developing and transition countries,45 and most bonds in developing countries
have been issued by subnational states and major cities.
Attempts however have been made to overcome the capacity limitations of smaller and
less endowed jurisdictions, by developing pooled financing mechanisms.46 In the last
decade, international agencies have been active in assisting central and local authorities
in developing countries to access domestic and international capital markets for financing
infrastructure, particularly in certain sectors, such as water supply and sanitation.
Since issuing bonds requires a rating of local authority creditworthiness, the prospect of
such financing for local infrastructure may pressure local politicians to exercise fiscal
discipline and improve financial management. Unfortunately, such incentives are diluted
where access to bond financing is made possible by credit enhancement mechanisms that
are poorly designed and transfer all or most default risk to the national treasury.
Implementing local infrastructure
The legal framework regulating local infrastructure procurement also shapes the behavior
of actors involved in local planning. A common problem is insufficient national attention
to developing appropriate local authority procurement systems and capacity. Standard
legal provisions and guidelines often largely reproduce the central procurement process.
Local authorities, however, require flexibility to realize the benefits of decentralization,
and central regulations may invite rule violation, abuse of exceptions and fiduciary risks,
which can be great without strong enforcement systems and actions.
Local authorities often encounter difficulties because of legal rigidities or inadequate
central guidance on implementing infrastructure projects through community contracting
or innovative service delivery programs that use community co-provision and coproduction arrangements. In addition, rules intended to minimize the influence of private
contractors on local procurement, if not well formulated and explained, may impede
efforts to leverage local social capital, strengthen local public-private cooperation and
help develop the local construction industry. Standardized and inappropriate procurement
rules may create incentives to avoid them. An example is the practice of artificially
breaking procurement of larger projects into smaller contracts, or worse, to choose certain
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See Platz (2009)
These include India, the Philippines, South Africa, Mexico, Brazil and some other South American
countries, Russia and several European transition countries.
46
Interesting pilot projects have been launched in Tanzania and Uganda under the UNCDF Local Finance
Initiative (LFI). The conceptual approach is documented in Bond, Platz, and Magnusson (2012)
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projects over potentially better ones because their small size allows avoidance of
competitive bidding requirements for contracts above a certain amount.47
Beyond the effects of the legal framework for local procurement, the efficient
implementation of locally planned infrastructure depends critically on the capacities of
the stakeholders. These include the capacity of the local administration to manage the
procurement process, the capacity of local engineers and contractors to deliver quality
services and works, and the capacity of local communities to oversee implementation.
The capacity to manage infrastructure procurement is generally a function of the size of a
jurisdiction and of a country’s overall development. It is particularly weak for small rural
local authorities in LDCs. Efforts to build capacity may appear disproportionately costly.
In some infrastructure programs in aid dependent countries, infrastructure spending is
overshadowed by capacity building, forcing consideration of alternative arrangements for
interjurisdictional cooperation and delegation of the procurement function.
Different capacity constraints plague the engineering function. Local authorities could
use private services, but national policies are often required to support the emergence of
an engineering consulting industry that could sustainably serve local infrastructure
development needs and make transparent the operation of the market for engineering
services to local authorities. In many LDCs, local authorities source engineering services
from deconcentrated agencies and accountability issues may arise. Deconcentrated
technicians may assume the functions of both client and engineer, reducing transparency
and compromising the monitoring role of local councils and user committees.
Similar considerations apply to the local contracting industry, the development of which
is constrained by the low volume of work available annually in a single jurisdiction. In
this respect, the strong political preference of local authorities for “buying locally” may
work against the interests of the most capable local construction firms, which are not
helped by an extreme segmenting of the market. Much as in the engineering services
industry, the construction industry could be effectively helped by the development of
supra-local (regional) markets in which they could compete annually for multiple
contracts until their level of capacity launches them onto the national market.
Finally, community oversight may have a positive impact on the quality, timeliness and
cost-effectiveness of local infrastructure implementation. This, however, requires the
definition of clear rules of engagement of the concerned communities in the construction
administration process. When this is not the case the consequences may be either an
ineffective and cosmetic role for community monitoring, or, at the other extreme, the
possibility for community groups to illicitly extract concessions from contractors (in the
forms of materials leakages and/or undocumented extra work) that may eventually be
recouped through quality reduction or cost increases paid by the local authority.
Figure 6 summarizes key points from the preceding discussion, highlighting the typs of
incentives that weak decentralization policies and institutional environments can create
for the range of actors involved in local infrastructure development and outcomes. Some
47
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of these incentives are at least partly inherent to the nature of the particular aspects of the
process under consideration, but they can be exacerbated or worsened by the way in
which national governments, or in the case of aid dependent countries, international
development agencies, structure the local infrastructure development systems they
promote and support.
Figure 6: Policy Weaknesses, Negative Incentives & Local Infrastructure Outcomes

POLICY ENVIRONMENT
(Weaknesses)

INCENTIVES
(negative)

ACTORS

LOCAL INFRASTRUCTURE OUTCOMES

To behave as agents of
central political patrons
Missing/unclear functional
assignments
No support for autonomous
action under the LG “general
mandate”
Confusion between localitybased multi-stakeholders plans
and corporate LG plans

Financing resources limited to
LDF-type (block grants) facilities

To resist even simplified
forms of appraisal

Local Councilors

To invest in quick projects
or break them into multiyear tranches

Deconcentrated
agencies

To shy away from coprovision or delegation
arrangements

Engineering
services
providers

To under-invest in capital
requirements of local
administration programs
To “re-capture”” LG
resources to support
central programs

Contractors
Financing resources limited to
Social Investment Funds -type
facilities

Lack of appropriate local
government procurement rules
and regulations

Inadequate national policy for
development of the engineering
and construction industry

Users Groups

To rely on “off-the-shelf”
design and forego
innovations

Projects that spread benefits in the
widest possible way (e.g. rural roads and
labor intensive micro-projects )
Projects that are popular and
uncontroversial but that may be neither
strategic nor technically / economically
justified
Projects that are disconnected from the
local administrations’ responsibilities for
services delivery and O&M

Projects with lower benefits and higher
costs because of breaks and overextension of implementation

To ignore non-technical
feasibility aspects of
infrastructure
To Collude

Projects that are technically simple (eg.
buildings, unpaved roads) and below
market cost, but of sub-standard quality

To work around rules and
“buy locally”

VIII. Looking Forward
Developing countries face considerable challenges in the design and operation of local
infrastructure planning systems in decentralized or decentralizing systems. Many of these
challenges are driven or influenced by diverse political economy dynamics that differ in
importance and degree across countries. From the beginning, the political economy
motivations underlying decentralization and other public sector reforms shape how the
planning system is developed and lay the foundations for how it functions and performs.
In practice, local infrastructure planning may involve a diverse range of actors at multiple
levels in various ways. These actors are differentially powerful depending on the context
in a particular country, and each typically has incentives to pursue some specific agenda.
In many countries, traditional centralist tendencies that are supposed to have been
lessened can remain influential during implementation. Even if political economy
incentives at higher levels allow genuine subnational government empowerment,
complex dynamics internal to local governments and their interactions with other local
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governments, with higher levels of government and with nongovernmental actors can be
consequential. These dynamics can support authentic local infrastructure planning or
undermine it, with potentially considerable impact on the results.
This paper has only selectively covered the complex terrain involved, and much of the
more detailed treatment focused primarily on the development of decentralized planning
systems in least developed countries. More work is clearly needed to better understand
the political and bureaucratic dynamics of local infrastructure planning and their impact
on infrastructure provision. In specific countries, it is necessary to determine the mix of
actors involved and their incentives to support, alter or capture the local planning process.
With such knowledge, it should be possible in many countries to redesign local
infrastructure planning systems in ways that would help to improve their performance.
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